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SEC NONACQUIESCENCE IN JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING:
TARGET COMPANY DISCLOSURE OF ACQUISITION
NEGOTIATIONS
DOUGLAS M. BRANSON*
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has recently
announced that it believes a recent decision by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to have been "wrongly de-
cided."' That decision dealt with the duty to disclose and timing of
disclosure of merger negotiations and, in turn, had drawn on several
other federal court decisions.2 The SEC also announced that it
would "[t]ake appropriate enforcement action against issuers which
fail to comply" with the SEC's view of the law's requirements. 3 Sub-
sequently, an SEC Commissioner opined that the SEC announce-
ments had been an Internal-Revenue-Service-like statement of
"nonacquiescence" in those judicial decisions.4
* Professor of Law, University of Puget Sound; Visiting Professor, University of
Oregon. B.A., University of Notre Dame, 1965; J.D., Northwestern University, 1970;
LL.M., University of Virginia, 1974.
1. In the Matter of Carnation Co., Exchange Act Release No. 22,214, [1984-1985
Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,801, at 87,596 n.8 (July 8, 1985) [herein-
after Carnation release] (commenting on Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751 (3d
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985)).
2. Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1215 (1985) (citing, inter alia, Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196 (3d Cir. 1982)).
3. Carnation release, supra note 1, at 87,597. The Commission has become quite
zealous on the point. In a recent case involving privately-held companies, the SEC filed
an amicus brief on petition for rehearing by one of the parties, urging deletion of a
dictum in the court's earlier opinion. See Memorandum of Securities and Exchange
Commission as Amicus Curiae at 6-8, Michaels v. Michaels, 767 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 797 (1986). The dictum had stated that merger negotia-
tions by a publicly held company are not material as a matter of law unless at least an
agreement in principle has been reached. See 767 F.2d at 1195-96. See also Brown, Cor-
porate Communications and the Federal Securities Laws, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 741, 785
(1985) (noting that the SEC has consistently disagreed with restrictive definitions of
"materiality" in this context).
4. Grundfest, Carnation Revisited: Toward an Optimal Merger Disclosure and Rumor Re-
sponse Policy, Address to the Federal Regulation of Securities Committee, American Bar
Association (Apr. 15, 1986), at 8, summarized in 18 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 521 (1986).
Of course, agency nonacquiescence in judicial decisionmaking is more frequent than is
commonly believed, but bold announcement of nonacquiescence has generally been
confined to a few agencies and executive departments, such as the Internal Revenue
Service. See generally Maranville, Nonacquiescence: Outlaw Agencies, Imperial Courts, and the
Perils of Pluralism, 39 VAND. L. REV. 471 (1986) (discussing increasing incidence of agency
nonacquiescence and resulting problems).
1001
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Besides leaving issuers of securities torn between fundamental
and irreconcilable precedent on disclosure of acquisition negotia-
tions, the SEC position also indicates nonacquiescence in recent
Supreme Court decisions on the proper policy perspective for view-
ing the securities laws' general antifraud provisions.5 The Commis-
sion position also seems to indicate nonacceptance of the bulk of
state judicial opinion concerning the effect of negotiations and pre-
liminary agreements on possible business combinations. Most im-
portantly of all, however, the SEC position reveals nonacquiescence
in, or lack of knowledge about, the reality of a world in which green-
mailers and arbitragers roam, eager for any indication that a com-
pany may be for sale or can be put "in play," or fodder with which
they can manufacture rumors to that effect.
The purpose of this article is to add flesh to the arguments
presented in this introduction. In particular, the article attempts to
outline the costs and benefits to a target company of disclosure as
mandated by the SEC position. From a weighing of costs and bene-
fits, rather than merely a close examination of the law, may come the
guidance that, in view of conflicting precedent and the SEC's nonac-
quiescence, companies desperately need.
I. JUDICIAL AND SEC DECISIONS
A. The Third Circuit
In Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc.6 Heublein had been under seige by
a hostile suitor, General Cinema Corporation. Confidential negotia-
tions were ongoing with R.J. Reynolds Co. as a potential "white
knight." 7 A tenfold increase in Heublein share volume during the
negotiations prompted a New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) inquiry.
A Heublein spokesperson replied that the "company was aware of
no reason that would explain the activity of its stock in trading
.... '8 The Third Circuit accepted the statement as literally true
since Heublein was not itself trading and seemed to be unaware of
any information leaks, two events in Heublein's control that could
5. See infra notes 60-86 and accompanying text.
6. 742 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985).
7. A "white knight" is "a partner in a friendly acquisition who rescues the target
from the clutches of the hostile bidder." L. SOLOMON, D. SCHWARTZ &J. BAUMAN, COR-
PORATIONS: LAW AND POLICY 332 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
8. 742 F.2d at 754. By one measure, an "aware of no reason" response to an in-
quiry could be viewed as belonging to that family of relatively benign, noncommittal
responses that includes the "no developments" and the "no comment" responses. See
in -a notes 107-119 and accompanying text.
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have explained an increase in trading volume. Implicit in the court's
analysis is the assumption that Heublein's internal information-han-
dling procedures were adequate. If the procedures were adequate,
no leak of acquisition negotiations would have been probable. Ab-
sent insider trading, merger discussions cause unusual market activ-
ity only when leaked to other investors. Knowing neither of leaks
nor of insider trading, Heublein's "aware of no reason" response
was literally true.
The Third Circuit went on to hold that preliminary merger ne-
gotiations are immaterial as a matter of law, because negotiations
ordinarily become material only when fundamental agreement has
been reached as to the price and structure of the acquisition.9 The
court explicitly rejected any "intent of the parties to merge" stan-
dard of materiality. 10
In the latter matter the Heublein court was assisted by its earlier
holding in Staffin v. Greenberg. " In that case the court had ex-
pounded at length:
The reason that preliminary merger discussions are
immaterial as a matter of law is that disclosure of them may
itself be misleading. A substantial body of opinion sug-
gests that disclosure of preliminary discussions would, by
and large, do more harm than good to shareholders and
the values embodied in the antifraud provisions of the
Act. 12
The court followed with additional explanation:
Those persons who would buy stock on the basis of the
occurrence of preliminary merger discussions preceding a
merger which never occurs, are left "holding the bag" on a
stock whose value was inflated purely by an inchoate hope.
If the announcement is withheld until an agreement in
principle on a merger is reached, the greatest good for the
greatest number results. If the merger occurs, all of the
company's shareholders usually benefit; if no merger
agreement is reached, the stock performs as it would have
in any event.I
Important to note, however, is that the Heublein court's reliance on
Staffin may have been, to a degree, misplaced. In Staffin target com-
9. Id. at 756 (citing Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1206 (3d Cir. 1982)).
10. Id. at 757.
11. 672 F.2d 1196 (3d Cir. 1982).
12. Id. at 1206 (citation omitted).
13. Id. at 1207 (footnote omitted).
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pany Bluebird, Inc. made no statements whatsoever. In that situa-
tion it is now generally conceded that, absent trading in its own
stock, no duty to speak exists.' 4 As a matter of technical disclosure
law, Heublein stands on a different footing: Once a target such as
Heublein does speak it must not do so in an incomplete or mislead-
ing way.
B. The SEC Position
A major Carnation Company shareholder began the sequence
of events that lead to the SEC's pronouncements in In the Matter of
Carnation Co. "5 Dissatisfied with Carnation's stock's performance,
the shareholder had approached an investment banker about a pos-
sible acquisition of Carnation by another company. Nestle, S.A. sur-
faced as a potential purchaser. One of Nestle's first acts was to
inform Carnation management that Nestle would terminate discus-
sions if Carnation made any public disclosure of Nestle's contacts
with Carnation. 6
One month later unusual activity in Carnation's stock caused a
rise of 4 5/8 in price and the first of two public announcements.
The treasurer of Carnation, whose responsibilities included re-
sponding to media inquiries but who had no knowledge of any ac-
quisition discussions, stated that "[t]here is no news from the
company . . . that would account for the stock action. "17 Two days
later the negotiators were still far apart, with Nestle offering $75 per
share and Carnation senior officials thinking of $90.
Twelve days later Carnation's stock price surged again, to a
high of 71 1/2. The uninformed Carnation spokesperson spoke
again, in qualified terms: "[T]o the best of my knowledge there is
nothing to substantiate either [rumor of Carnation's being ac-
quired]." He added, "We are not negotiating with anyone.""' Two
weeks later Nestle and Carnation announced agreement for Carna-
tion to be acquired at $83 per share.
14. See, e.g., Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys., Inc., 582 F. Supp. 128, 132-33 (S.D.N.Y.
1984). Schlanger is discussed at infra notes 34-46 and accompanying text. See also Brown,
supra note 3, at 750-53 (discussing the general rule of nondisclosure); Sheffey, Securities
Law Responsibilities of Issuers to Respond to Rumors and Other Publicity: Reexamination of a Con-
tinuing Problem, 57 NOTRE DAME LAW. 755, 756-66 (1982) (noting that affirmative disclo-
sure obligation turns on whether rumors are "attributable" to the issuer).
15. Carnation release, supra note 1, at 87,593.
16. Id. at 87,593. Such secrecy is, of course, in the purchaser's interest to prevent
rises in the target's stock price.
17. Id. at 87,594.
18. Id.
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The SEC position accepts that an issuer has no duty voluntarily
to come forth with disclosure of acquisition discussions, save when
the issuer is trading in its own shares.19 If an issuer chooses to make
a statement or respond to an inquiry, however, then the SEC posi-
tion is that the statement must be absolutely accurate. "Section
10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule lOb-5 thereunder prohibit an
issuer from making public statements that are false or that ... make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they
are made, not misleading."20 Thus, "[w]henever an issuer makes a
public statement or responds to an inquiry ... the statement must
be materially accurate and complete."" Last of all, "[a]n issuer
statement that there is no corporate development that would ac-
count for unusual market activity in its stock, made while the issuer
is engaged in acquisition discussions, may be materially false and
misleading. . . . The Commission believes that Heublein [with its
contrary conclusion] was wrongly decided." 22
According to the SEC, the Carnation Company treasurer's
statements that Carnation was not negotiating with anyone or that
to the "best of his knowledge" there was nothing to substantiate the
rumors, innocent though they may have been, were materially false
and misleading and deserving of enforcement action.23
The only appellate decision the SEC cited in Carnation, and the
principal decision upon which the commentators rely, is SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co. ,24 the decision that astounded the corporate world
by presaging open-ended liability for a corporation that had miss-
poken but had neither traded nor engaged in any other activity even
remotely described as nefarious. 25 After a vast mineral discovery
19. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 3, at 750-53, 761-72. The Commission also recog-
nizes that its only authority for requiring disclosure is the ubiquitous and opaque rule
lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1986). Id. at 747. Accord Sheffey, supra note 14, at 760-64
("[T]he most persuasive aspect of these decisions is that.. . even during the climate of
the ever-expanding jurisprudence of lOb-5, not one court held that there was an affirma-
tive general obligation to disclose." (footnote omitted)).
20. Carnation release, supra note 1, at 87,595 (paraphrasing clause (2) of rule lOb-5).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 87,596 & n.8.
23. Id. at 87,596-97.
24. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
25. See id. Nearly a generation of lawyers has now read Texas Gulf Sulphur without
being aware of or reflecting upon just how astounding the case was when first decided or
about how astounding it still may be. For a contemporaneous account, see Ruder, Corpo-
rate Disclosures Required by the Federal Securities Laws: The Codification Implications of Texas Gulf
Sulphur, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 872, 894-95 (1967) (arguing that elimination of any privity or
semblance of privity means "liability to vast numbers of plaintiffs may result"; liability
should at least be limited to defendant's illicit gains, if any).
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Texas Gulf Sulphur issued a press release, to abate rumors and buy
time in which to decide upon a proper course of action.2 6 The press
release was literally true. It stated that Texas Gulf Sulphur for a
number of years had been engaged in exploration activity in north-
ern Ontario but had largely discovered only barren pyrite and simi-
lar worthless minerals. Approximately five days later Texas Gulf
issued another, more accurate press release, revealing what was said
to be "one of the most impressive drill holes completed in modern
times. "27 The literal truth of the first press release availed Texas
Gulf Sulphur naught. The company's potential liability ran to $390
million,2" even though the company had not traded and arguably
had in no other way benefited from the errant press release.
Texas Gulf Sulphur, then, stands for two propositions. First is the
obvious aspect upon which the SEC relies: When an issuer does
choose to speak, statements by it must be materially complete and
not misleading, even though there had been no duty to speak in the
first place. Second, and less obvious, is that the literal truth of the
statement does not end the analysis. Thus, qualifiers added to state-
ments to make them literally true, such as the "aware of no reason"
qualifier accepted in Heublein, or the "to the best of my knowledge"
qualifier rejected in Carnation, do not free the issuer of liability or
enforcement action.
C. Other Prior Decisions
Two earlier cases often appear in discussions regarding disclo-
sure of acquisition negotiations. In Reiss v. Pan American World Air-
ways the Second Circuit considered a suit against an acquiring
corporation rather than the target. At the start of a program to re-
deem Pan Am convertible debentures, Pan Am failed to disclose
that simultaneously it was engaged in acquisition negotiations with
National Airlines. That acquisition would have been viewed as quite
favorable for Pan Am, giving it significant domestic route capacity
for the first time in many years. One week later Pan Am did disclose
26. The purpose of the press release was to abate rumors in order to facilitate the
acquisition of additional mining claims in the region of its discovery; by the time of the
erroneous press release, however, the company had apparently largely completed that
process. See 401 F.2d at 843-44.
27. Id. at 850.
28. See Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The Second Round: Privity and State of Mind in Rule
lOb-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 423, 429 (1968) (noting the $390 million
potential liability, approximately $150 million more than the net worth of the Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co. at that time).
29. 711 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1983).
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the National merger negotiations but did not tie that disclosure spe-
cifically to the redemption program."0 The following week Pan Am
announced that it was expanding, and later completed the redemp-
tion program.
Judge Winter declined to find a duty for Pan Am to have dis-
closed its acquisition negotiations at the earlier point when the de-
benture redemption program had begun. The plaintiffs, he found,
confused disclosure of material facts under the securities laws with
"consistency in corporate public relations decisions."'" Although
the former is by law required, the latter is not. In addition, material-
ity in merger negotiations is not lightly to be implied:
It does not serve the underlying purposes of the securities
acts to compel disclosure of merger negotiations in the not
unusual circumstances before us. Such negotiations are in-
herently fluid and the eventual outcome is shrouded in un-
certainty. Disclosure may in fact be more misleading than
secrecy so far as investment decisions are concerned....
We have no doubt that had Pan Am disclosed. . and had
those negotiations failed, we would have been asked to de-
cide a section [sic] lOb-5 action challenging that
disclosure.32
Reiss thus evidences a robust skepticism toward plaintiffs' claims that
acquisition negotiations should have been disclosed or were dis-
closed in a misleading way and has been cited for that proposition. 3
Schlanger v. Four-Phase Systems, Inc. "4 precedes the SEC release in
Carnation but follows Heublein in time, although decidedly not in
spirit. In his opinion Judge Brieant shows an obvious sympathy for
plaintiffs, an utter lack of empathy for corporate officials, and none
30. Id. at 13.
31. Id. at 13-14.
32. Id. at 14 (citations omitted). Judge Winter went on to find that Pan Am lacked
the scienter, or state of mind, that Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976),
requires. 711 F.2d at 14.
33. Viewed in one light, however, Reiss is only a silence or nondisclosure case, in
which no duty to disclose has been authoritatively asserted. See supra notes 19-22 and
accompanying text. Viewed another way, though, the case does involve incomplete dis-
closure, and the court declined to invoke the Texas Gulf Sulphur proscription of disclosure
in a literally true but incomplete manner. The first Pan Am press release announcing
the redemption program was literally true, but in the larger frame of things it was in-
complete. However, Judge Winter's statement that the law does not require consistency
in corporate communications indicates that he probably did not adopt the latter view.
Logical consistency might have forged a link between the redemption program and the
acquisition negotiations, but Judge Winter and his colleagues refuse to link the two as a
matter of law.
34. 582 F. Supp. 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
10071987]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
of the skepticism for plaintiffs' claims that Heublein, Staffin, and Reiss
exhibit.
Early in 1981 defendant Four-Phase approached its investment
banker and began a process of attempting to be acquired. General
Dynamics Corp., McDonnell Douglas Corp., and Motorola all ex-
pressed an interest in acquiring Four-Phase. 5 The search for a
partner went forward over a number of months and in fits and
starts.3 6
In October and November of 1981 Four-Phase's investment
banker concentrated its efforts on Motorola, and the other potential
acquirers drew out of sight. The putative partners exchanged in-
creasingly detailed information. On November 23 and 24 Motor-
ola's chairman visited Four-Phase's headquarters. No offer,
however, had yet been made. On December 2 Four-Phase trading
volume on the NYSE increased the telltale tenfold, and the price
increased 6 1/2 points.3 7 The treasurer of the company then dis-
seminated a Heublein-like announcement that "[t]he Company is not
aware of any corporate developments which would affect the market
of its stock."3 " On December 8 the NYSE halted trading. On De-
cember 10 Four-Phase announced a stock-for-stock transaction with
Motorola valued at $45 per share. As is typical in these cases, plain-
tiff brought a class action seeking damages on behalf of all those
who sold subsequent to the allegedly misleading press release and
thereby forewent the eventual, more dramatic gain.3 9
The Four-Phase defendants argued that merger negotiations
are "inherently fluid" and, therefore, are not material. More
pragmatically, a disclosure requirement would make merger negoti-
ations "virtually impossible."4 ° Wasting no time, Judge Brieant "at
the outset" found the Heublein decision to be "wrong, essentially be-
cause it fails to distinguish between cases involving false or mislead-
ing statements, and situations involving a decision merely to remain
silent .... ,,4' From that point of departure the case became for
Judge Brieant cut and dried:
[T]his Court concludes... that defendants, having chosen
35. Id. at 131.
36. At one point, all discussion ceased as Four-Phase sold a public offering of
debentures.
37. Id. at 130. The price increase in Heublein also resulted from a nearly tenfold
increase in trading volume. 742 F.2d at 754 n.1.
38. 582 F. Supp. at 129.
39. Heublein, Staffin, Reiss, and Texas Gulf Sulphur were all class actions of that nature.
40. 582 F. Supp. at 131.
41. Id. at 132.
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to issue a public statement .... were required to include in
that statement ... every "material fact necessary in order
to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading."
Plaintiff apparently concedes, and the Court agrees,
that Four-Phase could have remained silent ...."
The court went on to recite the Texas Gulf Sulphur rubric: "While the
federal securities laws do not impose a general duty upon an issuer
to disclose ... when it is not trading in its own securities, it does
have a duty to make certain that any statement it does issue is truth-
ful and complete . .. ."'
The judge also swiftly dismissed remaining defenses, such as
the absence of scienter that Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder and its prog-
eny4 4 demand:
[C]onclusory statements that high volume and sudden
price rises had occurred before, or that the company did
not have direct knowledge of leaks .... or that there was
no information indicating a "breach of confidentiality" re-
garding the negotiations with Motorola [do not] lead inevi-
tably to the conclusion that the defendants acted without
scienter. The trier of fact . . . could find that defendants
acted recklessly, because they were aware of unusual mar-
ket activity in Four-Phase's stock ... and no other possible
concurrent causative event or fact was known to them
45
Thus, the two prior decisions reviewed seem to line up firmly in
one camp or the other, despite the Four-Phase court's confident dis-
tinguishing of Reiss and Staffin as silence cases. 46 The latter two fit
nicely with Heublein in exhibiting an empathy for target company of-
ficials and a skepticism for plaintiffs' claims. On the other hand, the
Four-Phase opinion fits nicely with Carnation, viewing these matters as
essentially cut-and-dried applications of a rule of complete truth
when any disclosure is undertaken at all.
42. Id. (quoting rule lOb-5).
43. Id. at 133 (citing SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 860-62 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969)).
44. 425 U.S. 185 (1976). For a review of Hochfelder's progeny, see Note, Liability for
Aiding and Abetting Violations of Rule lOb-5: The Recklessness Standard in Civil Damage Actions,
62 TEX. L. REV. 1087, 1100-08 (1984).
45. 582 F. Supp. at 135 (citations omitted).
46. Id. at 133-34.
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D. Subsequent Decisions
So, too, do the reported cases subsequent to Carnation come
down firmly in one camp or the other. Much like the Four-Phase de-
cision, Levinson v. Basic Inc.4 7 involved protracted, and at times des-
ultory, acquisition negotiations. In fact, Combustion Engineering,
Inc. had first indicated an interest in acquiring Basic in 1965 or 1966.
In 1976 the Federal Trade Commission redefined the relevant prod-
uct market, making such an acquisition less problematic from an an-
titrust standpoint. 48  A Combustion Engineering group vice-
president then began a series of contacts with Basic that were to last
until the announcement of an acquisition two years and three
months later. During that time Combustion's interest rose from
prices of $18-22 per Basic share to the eventual acquisition price of
$46 per share.4" Also, during this protracted period, there were
several short bouts of trading activity in Basic shares. Each was met
by Basic's response that it was "unaware of any present or pending
corporate development that would result in the abnormally heavy
trading activity. '"50
The Sixth Circuit adopted the SEC and Texas Gulf Sulphur cut-
and-dried approach: There may be no duty to disclose, but once
any disclosure is made, complete truth and accuracy must prevail.5 '
More interesting is the court's treatment of materiality and the back-
ground of more than fourteen years' interest by the acquirer.
Basic's statement that "no negotiations" were occur-
ring was .. .misleading, if not patently untrue. Basic ar-
gues that the denial was technically correct because no
discussions occurred which would satisfy the legal defini-
tion of "negotiations." The average investor does not nec-
essarily know the technical and legal definition of these
words .... A statement that "no negotiations" were occur-
ring could reasonably be read to state that no contacts of
any kind whatsoever regarding merger had occurred. Be-
47. 786 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 1284 (1987).
48. Id. at 743.
49. The district court opinion takes 35 pages to recite and review the twists and turns
and lengthy nature of the discussion and negotiation that finally led to the acquisition.
See Levinson v. Basic Inc., [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
91,801, at 90,011-46 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 3, 1984).
50. 786 F.2d at 745. In addition, the acquiring company made the following state-
ment early in its two-and-a-half year approach: "[T]he company knew no reason for the
stock's activity and that no negotiations were under way with any company for a
merger." Id. at 744.
51. Id. at 746 (citing, inter alia, the SEC's position in the Carnation release, supra note
1010 [VOL. 46:1001
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cause of the "Strategic Plan" of [acquirer] Combustion re-
garding Basic, had there been only one telephone call ...
this statement would have been clearly untrue.52
The Sixth Circuit thus seems to go a step beyond a no-fault ap-
proach and makes the target also bound by the acquirer's activity
and intentions. Additionally, contrary to Heublein, which held that
acquisition discussions or negotiations do not become material until
there has been an agreement in principle to merge,53 the Sixth Cir-
cuit opines that even the earliest contacts with a would-be acquirer
may rule out use of noncommittal target company responses.54
Diametrically opposed to Levinson's approach is that of Judge
Shadur in Guy v. Duff & Phelps, Inc.55 " [D]isclosure is mandated only
when agreement, or at least an 'agreement in principle,' has been
achieved." Moreover, "[n]o 'agreement in principle' is reached un-
til the parties have at least agreed on both price and the structure of
the deal."56 Later in his opinion Judge Shadur elaborates, seem-
ingly with the benefit of a real world perspective:
Jeffries' [the acquirer's representative] testimony indi-
cates a tentative agreement as of July 29, 1983 on the total
purchase price and the fact the deal would be for cash
rather than stock. Jeffries spoke only of those terms. Noth-
ing in his testimony could lead to an inference the myriad
other aspects of the deal had been worked out. And of
course anyone who has handled major corporate acquisi-
tions knows a $50 million transaction necessarily involves
much more than the bottom-line number to reflect the
"agreement in principle" that triggers disclosure.57
Guy involves no public pronouncement, errant or otherwise,
and thus is a silence case rather than an allegedly misleading disclo-
sure case.58 On the issue of materiality, however, Guy stands in stark
52. Id. at 747.
53. 742 F.2d at 758. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
54. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit opinion can be read to say that an affirmative disclo-
sure, complete truth obligation may arise at that early point, even against the back-
ground of ten years' unfocused interest by the acquirer.
55. 628 F. Supp. 252 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
56. Id. at 255 (citing Heublein, 742 F.2d at 756; Reiss v. Pan Am. World Airways, 711
F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1983)). On the following page Judge Shadur quotes Reiss as explaining
"[wihy disclosure is not required-why instead it is actually improper in securities law
terms-before all the significant components of a deal have been worked out .... 628
F. Supp. at 256.
57. 628 F. Supp. at 259 (citation to deposition omitted) (emphasis in original).
58. Plaintiff nonetheless stated a claim because the corporation had been trading in
its own shares. In fact, in those trades the plaintiff had been the seller to the corpora-
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contrast to Levinson. In fact, the two cases widen further the already
considerable distance between the two lines of authority of which
each is a part. 9
Seldom will a lawyer see two such clear lines of authority so
rapidly developed, far apart, and diametrically opposed. That is
true both on the issue of when acquisition negotiations become ma-
terial and therefore must be disclosed if the target breaks its silence,
and the related issue of when literally true target company re-
sponses, intended to be noncommittal, become misleading. Ordi-
narily, an irreconcilable split between lines of authority might be of
no moment outside of the litigation context. Preventive law advice
would be to follow the most conservative approach: Disclose earlier
rather than later. If error is possible, err on the side of accuracy and
completeness. 60 But that easy preventive law advice cannot be given
in this context, because it does not take into account the other great
pressures and conflicting duties that law, markets, and the reality of
a modem world place upon target companies-pressures of which
the SEC and some courts seem blissfully unaware.
tion. Nonetheless, the facts of this case give rise to little sympathy for plaintiff, a Duff&
Phelps employee who had been competing with his employer on a moonlighting basis.
Given a choice of his competing business or continued employment, he chose the for-
mer and had to sell Duff & Phelps shares back to the company.
59. In the nearly contemporaneous case ofJordan v. Duff& Phelps, Inc., [1986-1987
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,724 (N.D. Ill. 1986), another departing
Duff & Phelps employee sued, alleging nondisclosure of the Security Pacific negotia-
tions. Finding lack of materiality-based upon the Third Circuit approach in Heublein,
the Second Circuit in Reiss, and Judge Shadur in Guy v. Duff & Phelps-Judge
Leinenweber found no duty to disclose and granted summary judgement for defend-
ants. Id. at 93,517. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the price-and-structure
materiality rule was inapplicable to close corporations because the same concern about
information leaks did not exist and because a stronger fiduciary duty existed in cases of
face-to-face dealings with employee shareholders. Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815
F.2d 429, 434-36 (7th Cir. 1987). Thus, the Seventh Circuit has taken an in-between
position. Compare Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1177 (7th Cir. 1987) ("[s]ilence
pending settlement of the price and structure of a deal is beneficial to most investors,
most of the time") with Jordan, 815 F.2d at 431 ("Things are otherwise for closely held
corporations."). But see Jordan, 815 F.2d at 444-52 (Posner, J., dissenting).
60. See, e.g., M. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION: LIABILITIES AND REMEDIES, §§
2.12.3 to 3.14.4 (1986) ("Counsel would be ill-advised to rely on Heublein. The decision
is contrary to the position taken by a number of other courts as well as the SEC. ...
From a counseling point of view, the SEC's release in Carnation in effect nullifies Heu-
blein.") (footnotes omitted). Strictly as a matter of current law, Professor Steinberg is
undoubtedly correct.
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II. LACK OF CONGRUENCE WITH THE SUPREME COURT'S POLICY
PERSPECTIVE IN THE SECURITIES LAW AREA
The linchpin for the SEC's and the Sixth Circuit's complete-
truth point of view is the decision in Texas Gulf Sulphur.6 Hence, it is
necessary to give additional scrutiny to that landmark decision and
to examine its congruence with the more recent Supreme Court de-
cisions, especially in regard to its findings concerning the corporate
issuer's liability. In Texas Gulf Sulphur Judge Waterman paid sono-
rous allegiance to "accurate and truthful divulgence of detailed re-
sults."' 62 In remanding the case to the district court for a finding on
the issue of whether the press release had been misleading, Judge
Waterman seemed to have prejudged the issue. "The choice of an
ambiguous general statement rather than a summary of the specific
facts cannot reasonably be justified by any claimed urgency" and "It
would have been more accurate to have stated that the situation was
in flux" were his conclusions on the matter. 63 From a policy stand-
point, Judge Waterman viewed the strict truth-and-accuracy ap-
proach necessary to avoid the temptation for corporate officials to
use evasive and noncommittal responses to mask illicit activity. 64 It
was not necessary that any insider had traded or intended to do so,
for the Second Circuit designed its approach using the prospect of
astounding corporate liability to remove even a temptation for cor-
porate officials to trade.65 In turn, removal of any temptation to
trade was a ramification of the Court's beginning premise: "Rule
[10b-5] is based in policy on the justifiable expectation of the securi-
ties marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges
have relatively equal access to material information ... 66
In its two leading decisions on rule lOb-5 the Supreme Court
has explicitly rejected that premise:
[T]he SEC's theory of... liability in both [Supreme
Court] cases appears rooted in the idea that the antifraud
provisions require equal information among all traders.
This conflicts with the principle set forth in Chiarella that
61. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
62. 401 F.2d at 864.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 858-59 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934)). This
part of the House Report, however, does not address the catchall antifraud rule, but
rather the affirmative disclosure and reporting sections of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. See 401 F.2d at 885 (Moore, J., dissenting).
65. 401 F.2d at 860-62. This becomes doubly evident when the court's view on state
of mind is examined. See infra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
66. Id. at 848.
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only some persons, under some circumstances, will be
barred from trading while in possession of material, non-
public information. Judge Wright correctly read our opin-
ion in Chiarella as repudiating any notion that all traders
must enjoy equal information before trading: "[T]he 'in-
formation' theory is rejected. Because the disclose-or-re-
frain duty is extraordinary, it attaches only when a party
has legal obligations other than a mere duty to comply with
the general antifraud proscriptions in the federal securities
laws." 67
Use of the equality-of-information theory to police not those who
trade but only those who have a possible temptation to trade, and to
do so through the prospect of Draconian liability for the nontrading
corporate issuer, seems doubly dissonant with the Supreme Court's
finding.6"
The Texas Gulf Sulphur decision is also out of step with much of
the Supreme Court's discussions of scienter, or state of mind, under
the rule. The Texas Gulf Sulphur court seemed completely outcome-
oriented:
[W]e must again underscore at the risk of repetition that
the investing public is hurt by exposure to false or decep-
tive statements irrespective of the purpose underlying their
issuance.... Accordingly, we hold that Rule lOb-5 is vio-
lated whenever assertions are made ... in a manner rea-
sonably calculated to influence the investing public .. .if
such assertions are false or misleading or are so incomplete
as to mislead irrespective of whether the issuance of the
release was motivated by corporate officials for ulterior
purposes.69
67. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 657 (1983) (footnote omitted) (discussing Chiarella
v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980)).
68. See 463 U.S. at 654:
In examining whether Chiarella had an obligation to disclose or abstain, the
Court found that there is no general duty to disclose before trading ... and
held that "a duty to disclose under § 10(b) does not arise from the mere pos-
session of nonpublic market information." Such a duty arises rather from the
existence of a fiduciary relationship.
Not "all breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with a securities transac-
tion," however, come within the ambit of Rule lOb-5. Sante Fe Industries, Inc.
v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977). There must also be "manipulation or
deception." Id. at 473 (footnote omitted; citations omitted).
69. 401 F.2d at 861-62 (footnote omitted; citation omitted). The court also stated:
To render the Congressional purpose ineffective by inserting into the statutory
words the need of proving not only that the public may have been misled by the
release, but also that those responsible were actuated by a wrongful purpose
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Subsequently, the Supreme Court has twice made clear that a pri-
vate plaintiff or the Commission must prove scienter in section
10(b) actions, 70 and has also gone out of its way to condemn pre-
cisely the outcome-oriented reasoning found in Texas Gulf Sulphur.7'
In fact, the argument can be made that if an allegedly misleading
disclosure occurs when the defendant had no legal obligation to dis-
close, as in the acquisitions context, the scienter or state of mind
requirement should scale upward.72
III. LACK OF CONGRUENCE WITH THE REALITIES
OF CORPORATE LIFE TODAY
Cutting against the more exacting standard of the SEC and the
Sixth Circuit and against a finding that the requisite state of mind is
present is the factual setting in which these cases arise. The pres-
sures on a target company can be great. If disclosure is made and
when they issued the release, is to handicap unreasonably the Commission in
its work.
Id. at 861.
70. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (damages); SEC v. Aaron, 446
U.S. 680 (1980) (injunctive relief).
71. Compare Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 860:
Congress... intended only that the device employed, whatever it might be, be
of a sort that would cause reasonable investors to rely thereon .... There is no
indication that Congress intended that the corporations or persons responsible
for the issuance of a misleading statement would not violate the [securities
laws] unless they engaged in a related securities transaction or otherwise acted
with wrongful motives; indeed, the obvious purposes of the Act to protect the
investing public . . . would be seriously undermined by applying such a gloss
onto the legislative language .... [T]he investing public may be injured as
much by one's misleading statement containing inaccuracies caused by negli-
gence as by a misleading statement published intentionally to further a wrong-
ful purpose.
with Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 198-99:
The Commission . . . reasons that since the "effect" upon investors of given
conduct is the same regardless of whether the conduct is negligent or inten-
tional, Congress must have intended to bar all such practices and not just those
done knowingly or intentionally. The logic of this effect-oriented approach
would impose liability for wholly faultless conduct where such conduct results
in harm to investors, a result the Commission would be unlikely to support.
But apart from where its logic might lead, the Commission would add a gloss to
the operative language of the statute quite different from its commonly ac-
cepted meaning.
72. See, e.g., Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1300 (2d Cir. 1973)
(comparing voluntary press release with proxy statement required by law). This type of
sliding-scale analysis is prevalent in rule lOb-5 cases, particularly in the Second and
Ninth Circuits. See, e.g., Branson, Collateral Participant Liability Under the Securities Laus-
Charting the Proper Course, 65 OR. L. REV. 327, 350-55 (1986); Branson, Statutor
, 
Securities
Fraud in the Post-Hochfelder Era: The Continued Viability of Modes of Flexible Analysts, 52 TUL.
L. REV. 50, 55-66, 91-95 (1977).
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the acquisition does not take place, the target company fears that it
may be sued by those investors who had purchased in anticipation
of the transaction. 73
Although in theory these disappointed purchasers have the req-
uisite standing and a seemingly prima facie cause of action, 4 such is
not evident in the reported cases. Instead, it is internally generated
corporate pressure, rather than the threat of suit by disappointed
purchasers, that tends to cut against disclosure at an early point.
Even though suits by disappointed purchasers are not common, cor-
porations undoubtedly treasure whatever credibility they have in the
markets. Premature disclosures can erase whatever stock of credibil-
ity a company may have accumulated.
Another pressure is the confidentiality requirement participants
in negotiations put upon themselves for a number of reasons. One
reason for this pressure is to reduce or eliminate the possibility of
insider tipping or trading. A second reason is to retain credibility in
the markets. The third reason is to preserve a less pressured envi-
ronment for negotiation of all the material elements of the bargain,
which can often include much more than the price and structure to
which courts have referred. 75 Integration of the corporations' se-
nior managements, plant closings and elimination of duplicate staff
and facilities, and similar details may be key ingredients in the bar-
gaining process. 76 The limelight that disclosure generates may in-
crease beyond the breaking point the already considerable pressure
to reach an agreement.
A third pressure is the pledge of confidentiality the acquiring
company often will put upon the target.7 7 As with best efforts and
no-shop clauses, breakup or cancellation fees, and leg-up and lock-
up options,78 the acquirer swears the target company to secrecy in
73. Several courts have noted this problem. See, e.g., Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d
1196, 1206-07 (3d Cir. 1982).
74. Since they have purchased, they have the standing requisite for rule lob-5 plain-
tiffs. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); Birnbaum v. New-
port Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1953).
75. See, e.g., Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 757 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. de-
nied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985) (explaining that acquisition negotiations ordinarily become
material when agreement has been reached as to price and structure).
76. See Mitchell, Stewart & Paul, International Paper to Buy Hammermill: Agreement for
$1.1 Billion Tops an Unwanted Offer by Bilzerian-Led Group, Wall St.J., Aug. 12, 1986, at 3,
col. 3-4 (noting that retention of target company headquarters in Erie, Pa. was deemed
an essential element of the transaction).
77. This occurred in the Carnation case. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
78. A lock-up or leg-up option has been defined as:
An advantage obtained by a bidder designed to preclude competitive bids or
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order to guard against any untoward rise in the target share price.
Confidentiality also prevents or delays an auction for the target
from developing. Overuse of these devices, however, has led courts
to rule that the fiduciary duties of target company directors override
the contractual provision implementing the device, particularly
when use of the device is seen as chilling rather than facilitating the
bidding process. 79 The key for acquirers then will become the use
of some of the devices to inhibit development of an auction without
seeming to do so. But a by-product of that development will be
even additional acquirer pressure to maintain confidentiality as a re-
placement for reduced permitted use of the other devices used in
negotiated acquisitions to favor one bidder over any other. The
longer confidentiality can be maintained, the less time there will be
for an auction to develop.
A fourth pressure is target-company generated. Once disclo-
sure of acquisition negotiations takes place, arbitragers move into
the target company stock.8 0 Although individual investors might be
quite sensible in selling shortly after an initial announcement, target
company managers abhor the resulting accumulation of stock in ar-
bitragers' hands. Managers may claim a preference for receipt of
the entire gain by faithful shareholders and not by fickle arbitragers.
Managers' real fear, however, is the current market milieu in which,
with good reason, arbitragers and other market professionals be-
lieve that they can make something happen. The target company
furnish an edge over other bidders. The lock-up may, for example, consist of an
option or shares .... An option on 50% of the target shares would, for exam-
ple, preclude competition. A lock-up may also consist of a crown jewel option
or purchase, especially at a bargain.
SOLOMON, SCHWARTZ & BAUMAN, supra note 7, at 329.
No-shop and best efforts clauses are discussed at infra notes 87-96 and accompany-
ing text. Hello and goodbye fees, also known as engagement and cancellation fees, and
their use, are described in Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d
264, 269 (2d Cir. 1986). These devices have received varied treatment upon legal at-
tack. See infra notes 88-103 and acompanying text.
79. See infra notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
80. As has been recently learned, however, arbitragers often move into target com-
pany stock before disclosure of the agreement or other announcement. See, e.g., Stewart
& Hertzberg, Spreading Scandal: Fall of Ivan F. Boesky Leads to Broader Probe of Insider Infor-
mation, Wall St.J., Nov. 17, 1986, at 1, col. 6.
It is surprising how many individual and other investors are content with the gain
in price an initial announcement produces. Many investors are content to give up the
remaining increment of potential gain, along with the risk that the acquisition may fall
through, to risk arbitragers. SeeJensen, Don't Freeze the Arbs Out, Wall St. J., Dec. 3, 1986,
at 26, col. 4-6 (arguing that arbitragers "provide risk-bearing services for investors who
do not wish to bear the great uncertainty that occurs between the announcement and
final outcome of a takeover bid or restructuring").
1987] 1017
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
that makes a premature disclosure only to have the acquisition fall
through will be faced with another, less friendly proposal.8 '
"[R]umors start to fly, the money managers sell when the stock
reaches a certain level above what they paid for it, it's grabbed up by
speculators, and the company is in play."8 2 Once a company is in
play the belief is that a bustup or takeover is "inevitable." 3 These
beliefs and the pressures thereby generated give target managers an
incentive to prevent leaks and rumors. They also create an incentive
to disclose negotiations later rather than sooner, and make more
understandable target managers' felt need to make noncommittal
"no developments" or "aware of no reason" replies to press or
other inquiries concerning possible acquisition negotiations.8 4 Fi-
nally-Judge Brieant's comments in the Four-Phase case to the con-
trarySS-the pressures that target company managers feel is
underscored by the state of mind requirement the Supreme Court
has so emphatically demanded for liability under rule lOb-5. s6
IV. LACK OF CONGRUENCE WITH RECENT
STATE LAW DEVELOPMENTS
A cost of compliance with the SEC's and Sixth Circuit's com-
plete-truth, sooner-rather-than-later approach is that such a call for
disclosure cuts against trends emerging under state law. In the state
law realm, the case that has received widest publicity is Texaco, Inc. v.
Pennzoil Co. 7
In Pennzoil plaintiff Pennzoil Co. entered into a preliminary
agreement, an agreement in principle, or some sort of arrangement
to acquire working control of Getty Oil Co.-or so Pennzoil had
thought. Versions of what had taken place varied, as did the charac-
81. That proposal may be for another acquisition, or for the purchase by the target
company of an arbitrager's or other takeover player's shares in a greenmail transaction.
Greenmail payments inevitably produce adverse publicity, travail, and litigation, despite
respectable theoretical arguments to the contrary. See Macey & McChesney, A Theoretical
Analysis of Corporate Greenmail, 95 YALE L.J. 13 (1985); Sandier, Greenmail Is Infuriating
Many Stockholders, but Fighting It Still Offers Little Satisfaction, Wall St. J., Dec. 11, 1986, at
67, col. 3-4.
82. 16 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), 1721 (Nov. 2, 1984) (reporting remarks of An-
drew C. Sigler, chairman and chief executive officer of Champion Int'l Corp.).
83. Id.
84. See infra notes 107-119 and accompanying text.
85. See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
86. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212-15 (1976).
87. 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). See also Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co,, 784
F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1986).
1018 [VOL. 46:1001
SEC NONACQUIESCENCE
terizations of any agreement that may have resulted. 88 Agreement
did exist that whatever had been reached resembled more of a hand-
shake deal than a definitive agreement. Despite whatever agreement
existed, however, Texaco wrested Getty Oil away from Pennzoil by
offering better terms.89 Pennzoil then sued Texaco for $7.5 billion
actual and $3 billion punitive damages for Texaco's interference.9"
At trial Pennzoil recovered all that it had sought. Handshake deals,
or agreements in principle, were held to be enforceable and inter-
ference with them was perceived by the jurors as having "violated
the ethical code of the oil patch." 9 '
Thus, under Pennzoil merger negotiations may result in a bind-
ing contract and become material at an earlier point. If the target
company then breaks its silence for any reason, the SEC's complete-
truth approach requires disclosure of the merger negotiations. By
far the greater weight of emerging state law, however, finds that cor-
porate directors' fiduciary duties in effect override any contract and
require directors to commit to any specific acquisition proposition
only at the last possible moment.
For example, while Pennzoil was receiving wide publicity, a
nearly identical case was winding its way through the Nebraska
courts.92 On the second merger attempt the boards of directors of
bidder ConAgra, Inc. and target MBPXL, Inc. executed a letter of
intent for a stock-for-stock merger. A short time later the two com-
panies executed a definitive merger agreement. The agreement
pledged the target's and its board of directors' best efforts to effec-
88. See, e.g., Lippman, Pennzoil Chairman to Take Woeful Tale into Courtroom; Executive
Claims Getty Oil Deal Was Killed by Texaco Intervention, Wash. Post, July 7, 1985, at K3, col. 1
(discussing dispute about effect of tumultuous 25 hour meeting of board of directors of
Getty Oil).
89. Id. Texaco offered $125 for every Getty share, while Pennzoil had agreed only to
pay $112.50 for three-sevenths of the Getty shares.
90. Id. Pennzoil did not join Getty Oil, Gordon Getty, and the Getty Museum be-
cause Texaco had agreed to indemnify those participants for any liabilities arising from
their dealings with Texaco. Id. Any recovery from Getty interests, then, would ulti-
mately come from Texaco. For that and other tactical reasons Pennzoil decided to pro-
ceed directly against Texaco and that source alone, although Pennzoil had obvious
claims against target Getty.
91. Lippman,Jury Awards $10.53 Billion to Pennzoil in Texaco Case, Wash. Post, Nov. 20,
1985, at AI, col. 2. The verdict was viewed as having done "everybody in this country a
favor by reaffirming the standards by which American businesses and individuals are
expected to conduct their business transactions." Id. (statement of Pennzoil ChairmanJ.
Hugh Liedtke).
92. ConAgra, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 222 Neb. 136, 382 N.W.2d 576 (1986). See generally
Kalish, ConAgra, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., An Interpretive Essay: A Target Corporation May, But Need
Not, Agree That Its Directors Serve as Auctioneers for Its Shareholders, 65 NEB. L. REv. 823
(1986).
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tuate the transaction. MBPXL's counsel, however, specifically bar-
gained for and obtained a limitation on that contract language:
"Provided, however, nothing herein contained shall relieve either
Boards of Directors of their continuing duties to their respective
shareholders.""3 Almost simultaneously with the execution of that
agreement, two influential MBPXL shareholders approached Car-
gill, which had been observing the ConAgra-MBPXL dealings.
The approach to Cargill ultimately resulted in a $27 per share
cash offer, evaluated by MBPXL's investment banker as superior to
the ConAgra merger offer.94 The MBPXL board then voted to ne-
gotiate a mutual termination of the ConAgra merger and to recom-
mend the Cargill bid to MBPXL shareholders. At that time
ConAgra already had pending a suit against Cargill and MBPXL for
injunctive relief and damages. Ultimately, the Nebraska trial court
awarded ConAgra $16 million in damages for tortious interference
with contractual relations.95 The Supreme Court of Nebraska re-
versed per curiam:
Once the directors of MBPXL learned of the competing
Cargill offer, the "best efforts" clause in the ConAgra pro-
posal could not relieve the MBPXL directors of their duties
to act in the shareholders' best interests. They had an obli-
gation at that point to investigate the competing offer, and
if, in the exercise of their independent good faith judge-
ment, they found that the Cargill offer was a better offer for
the MBPXL shareholders, they were bound to recommend
the better offer.96
Increasingly, courts have looked askance at no-shop and best
efforts clauses and leg-up and lock-up options designed to aid a fa-
vored bidder.97 They have done so particularly when the devices
infringe on the voting rights of shareholders or chill the bidding
93. 382 N.W.2d at 582. Of course, prior and subsequent decisions have held that
such a provision would be an implied term of any agreement to merge or otherwise sell
a company. See, e.g., Great W. Producers Coop. v. Great W. United, 200 Col. 180, 613 P.
2d 873, 878 (1980) (finding that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, best efforts
clause in contract for sale of stock did not impose obligation that would conflict with
directors' duties to security holders). Cf Jewel Cos. v. Pay Less Drug Stores N.W., 741
F.2d 1555, 1564 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding that target board can bind company to forbear
from accepting competing offers until shareholders have opportunity to consider propo-
sal, regardless of later, higher offer).
94. 382 N.W.2d at 585.
95. Id. at 579.
96. Id. at 588.
97. These terms are discussed, in part, at infra note 78.
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process.98 Once a decision to sell the company has been made, di-
rectors' fiduciary duties cause their role to "[c]hange from defend-
ers of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the
best price for the stockholders .... " Hence, "[a] no-shop provi-
sion, like the lock-up option, while not per se illegal, is impermissible
... when a board's primary duty becomes that of an auctioneer re-
sponsible for selling the company to the highest bidder."' 100
Thus, under state law and contrary to the much publicized
Texas decision in Pennzoil, in the mergers and acquisitions area "it
ain't over until its over," to paraphrase a famous baseball player's
line. The point at which discussions and negotiations move from a
state of flux to taking shape, and possibly become material, is now
much later in the process than has traditionally been thought.
As has been seen, however, some commentators' 0 ' and most
courts10 2 opine that the directors' duty is to facilitate or conduct an
auction once a decision has been made to sell the company. Early
disclosure of the decision to sell or of the first bid, rather than non-
disclosure or late disclosure, comports with the emerging state law
duty to facilitate the bidding process. But such early disclosure
should be viewed as ancillary to or required by state corporation law
rather than federal securities law. Companies should remain free to
test the acquisition waters or to speak to a potential bidder who ap-
proaches them, without putting their companies "in play" or being
required to make disclosures at the first sign of inordinate trading in
their stock. Thus, the Heublein, Reiss, and Staffin 103 views on disclo-
sure and the flexibility they bestow, and not the SEC and Sixth Cir-
cuit view, fit more neatly with duties and costs imposed by state law.
98. See, e.g., Thompson v. Enstar Corp., 509 A.2d 578 (Del. Ch. 1984) (explaining
that lock-up agreements should be carefully scrutinized to insure that they serve the best
interests of the shareholders).
99. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).
100. Id. at 184. Of similar ilk are Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781
F.2d 264, 274 (2d Cir. 1986) (striking down target company's granting of lock-up option
and holding that the "role of the court in an action to enjoin takeover measures is to
allow the forces of the free market to determine the outcome to the greatest extent
possible within the bounds of the law"); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 878-80
(Del. 1985) (viewing no-shop clause and leg-up option with skepticism).
101. Two leading pieces are Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A
Reply and Extension, 35 STAN. L. REV. 23 (1982), and Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus
Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. REV. 51 (1982).
102. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 6-14, 29-33 and accompanying texts.
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V. AN ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF
CONDUCT FOR ISSUERS
A. No Comment Responses
Advocates of the SEC and Sixth Circuit point of view see re-
sponses of the "no comment" variety as preferable to what they
view as the dissembling "aware of no developments" response.
1 0 4
No-comment responses, however, seem a certain tip to arbitragers,
greenmail candidates, and other sophisticated professionals. Those
players will treat a no-comment response as probative of the matter
denied. Perhaps the only individuals who will be fooled by a no-
comment response will be individual investors. No-comment re-
sponses thus will exacerbate inequality among investors, if not ine-
quality of information among investors, a condition that the
Commission continues to bemoan, Supreme Court admonitions to
the contrary.' 05
B. The Matter of Corporate Policy Response
A variant on the no-comment response is the corporate-policy
response. In answer to an inquiry an issuer can state that "as a mat-
ter of policy the Company does not comment on acquisition negoti-
ations or upon market rumors relating to acquisition negotiations."
If the issuer has in the past been freely forthcoming with the media
and with analysts, of course, a no-comment policy will have little
credibility. In fact, the no-comment policy response may have the
same reverse effect that a simple no-comment response is likely to
produce. Put into place and consistently adhered to over months
and years, however, a no-comment policy would gain credibility.
Market professionals would become less able or willing to guess
what lies beyond the no-comment facade.'0 6 The undesirable side
effect, though, would be that the need to adhere consistently to the
policy would prevent the company from making some communica-
tions it sorely wants to make. In that way, a no-comment policy
would be antithetical to the goal of the securities laws, which is to
promote a free flow of corporate disclosures.
104. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 3, at 791; Grundfest, supra note 4, at 521 (reporting
views of others); Sheffey, supra note 14, at 787-88.
105. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
106. But as Judge Easterbrook has noted: "No corporation follows the CIA's policy
of saying 'no comment' to eey inquiry; every firm regularly confirms or devises rumors
as the securities laws and the stock exchanges' rules require." Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814
F.2d 1169, 1178 (7th Cir. 1987) (emphasis in original).
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C. Noncommittal Responses
In this category fall the literally true "aware of no develop-
ments" responses the Third Circuit accepted in Heublein.10 7 Often
the maker of such a response is without guile or fault, or, alterna-
tively, no fault is demonstrated. As discussed, the pressures on the
target company to maintain confidentiality are considerable. The
source of the leak or tip, which produces appreciation in the target's
stock price and the resulting inquiry as to developments, could well
be, and probably often is, an investment banking firm involved in
the negotiations. ' 0 8 Alternatively, the source of the leak or tip could
be the acquiring firm.'l 9 Yet, since selling plaintiffs' foregone gains
occurred in the target company's stock, it is always the target com-
pany that becomes a defendant in a lawsuit." l0
If target companies are at fault, as Judge Brieant intimated in
the Four-Phase case,"' the fault is not grievous fault. Instead, the
actions of target companies are quite understandable in light of the
considerable pressures to maintain confidentiality and to disclose
later rather than sooner." 2 Additionally, target companies have
probably viewed "aware of no developments" as but a variation on
the no-comment response. A corroboration of that view is con-
tained in the New York Stock Exchange rule that calls for companies
107. See supra notes 6-13 and accompanying text.
108. See, e.g., SEC v. Levine, 18 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 709, 709 (S.D.N.Y. May 12,
1986) (charging managing partner of major takeover investment banking firm with reap-
ing $12.6 million in illicit profits by trading or tipping others to trade in 54 nonpublic
merger, tender offer, leveraged buyout, and other corporate transactions). Indeed, it
has come to light that in Carnation itself the source of the leaks was the investment
banker and the purchaser of shares, none other than Ivan Boesky. See Japlin v. Boesky,
No. 87C 1186, reported at 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 332 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 1987) (class
action filed on behalf of Carnation shareholders who sold). See also Dorfman, Arbitragers
Face Investors' Suits on Inside Trades, Wall St. J., Mar. 5, 1987, at 25, col. 3.
109. Again, however, as with the target company, the acquirer has an incentive to
maintain confidentiality. Confidentiality will result in a lower acquisition cost for any
toe-hold position the acquirer accumulates. Most acquirers do acquire toe-hold posi-
tions, in part, as a partial insurance policy against the possibility of a successful compet-
ing offer. The acquirer will at least earn a profit on sale of the toe-hold. In the event of
a successful transaction, the acquisition of a toe-hold will result in lower overall average
costs per share for the acquirer. Maintaining confidentiality for as long as possible is
also believed to keep acquisition costs low by minimizing the chance of a rival bidder
emerging.
110. But see Litton Indus. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc., 18 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) 1237 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 1986) (acquirer suit against investment banking firm for
trading and tipping by employee, allegedly adding $30 million to cost of target company
stock).
11. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
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to respond in precisely those "aware of no developments" terms if a
company either has no response or chooses to make no com-
ment." 3 Quite ironically, companies that have taken the time to
comply with NYSE or other self-regulatory organizations' rules and
have done so too literally have found themselves defending lawsuits
for hundreds of millions of dollars."
14
That prospect of astounding liability is to be contrasted with
the degree of fault involved, and also with the potential liability of
the defendant who actually does trade or tip. As Dean Ruder long
ago observed,
[I]t would seem unjust to impose liability on a defendant
who has not engaged in a securities transaction because he
failed to disclose material information which he withheld in
good faith for sound business reasons. Yet the latter result
might be reached if one accepts the proposition that privity
is not required, that good faith is not a defense, and that an
affirmative duty to disclose exists." 5
In the case of defendants who have actually traded or tipped,
and thus clearly had the requisite state of mind, the courts have
gradually come to limit damages. At first, courts required some
causal connection between plaintiff's alleged loss and defendant's
113. New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual § 202.03, reprinted in 3 Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) § 23,517 (1985).
114. The scope and nature of self-regulatory organizations' rules, including those of
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), and the
National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation (NASDAQ) systems are
beyond the scope of this article. For a summary, see Brown, supra note 3, at 772-78;
Sheffey, supra note 14, at 757-62. Those rules are further beyond the scope of this arti-
cle because, a few early decisions to the contrary, violation of those rules has universally
been held to not necessarily give rise to liability to investors. Compare Buttrey v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135, 142 (7th Cir.) (whether a violation of
exchange or dealer rules gives rise to federal civil liability depends on the nature of the
particular rule and its place in the regulatory scheme), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969)
with Brown, supra note 3, at 776 n. 144 (cases cited therein). The matter of a violation is
between the self-regulatory organization and the company.
115. Ruder, supra note 25, at 899. See also Ruder, supra note 28, at 441:
[W]hen privity of contract is eliminated as an element in recovery ... the real
difficulty in justifying results occurs. When the misrepresenting or nondisclos-
ing defendant has engaged in a securities transaction but not with the plaintiff
(no privity), allowing recovery raises drastic implications since the defendant's
liability may far exceed the profit he made in his own transaction. If liability is
justified on the ground that the defendant should bear the risk of misrepresent-
ing, . . . his state of mind becomes crucial in assessing the fairness of such
liability.
When the defendant has engaged in no transaction at all, as with target company de-
fendants in these cases, unlimited liability seems doubly drastic and state of mind more
crucial yet.
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gain. "'6 Later, although not returning to a strict privity require-
ment, courts limited the sum of all plaintiffs' recovery to the gain
made or the loss foregone by the trading or tipping defendant.' 1 7
Later decisions have narrowed the measure of damages still further,
at least in selected cases." 8
By contrast, and principally on the authority of Texas Gulf
Sulphur, the nontrading, nontipping corporate defendant remains
potentially liable for astounding amounts. The amounts can be so
astounding that defendants settle before any court has the opportu-
nity to relate the measure of damages to the relative lack of fault
involved in these cases." 9 Courts have not had the opportunity to
fashion some reasonable limitation on damages, as they have in
cases of seemingly more culpable trading or tipping defendants.
VI. CONCLUSION
Practical realities and considerable real world pressures thus
lead to the conclusion that acquisition negotiations should be
viewed as material later rather than sooner in the acquisition pro-
cess. As a result, when target companies do speak, disclosure of any
negotiation or possible agreement in principle should be required
later rather than sooner. Courts should also permit target compa-
nies increased latitude to make truthful but noncommittal responses
to media, analyst, and other inquiries, as did the Third Circuit in
Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc.
More radically, the Securities and Exchange Commission
should refrain from intervention or pronouncements in this com-
plex area. So, too, courts should refrain from ruling on target com-
pany disclosures, at least on the basis of federal securities laws and
in less than egregious cases. Alternatively, courts should strike out
116. See, e.g., Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1053 (1977) (holding that plaintiffs who traded on the impersonal market were unaf-
fected by defendant's wrongful acts and were therefore not entitled to recover).
117. The leading case adopting this disgorgement-only approach is Elkind v. Liggett
& Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980).
118. See, e.g., SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1983) (holding that insider
need only disgorge that part of the profit attributable to the material investment infor-
mation withheld rather than all profits made in the transaction). Cf. Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 889 (Del. 1985) (rejecting, in the context of a state law duty of
care violation, the view "that [liability] may result in a multi-million dollar class award
against the defendants for having made an allegedly uninformed business judgment in a
transaction not involving any personal gain, self-dealing, or claim of bad faith").
119. See, e.g., R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERI-
ALS, 1085 (5th ed. 1982); Mullaney, Theories of Measuring Damages in Securities Cases and the
Effects of Damages on Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 277, 277-79 (1977).
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to limit the measure of damages for a target company that might be
viewed as having misspoken in connection with acquisition negotia-
tions. At present the potential liability is astounding and out of all
proportion to the degree of fault involved.
Perhaps the most preferable of the alternatives is for courts and
agencies to relegate disclosure of acquisition negotiations to state
corporate law and the rules of self-regulatory organizations. State
law fiduciary duties, and the auction model that state law is begin-
ning to incorporate, will produce disclosure that best accommodates
all the interests involved, including target company managers,
shareholders who sell, and those who do not. Emerging state law
concepts and duties in the acquisition context may produce the opti-
mal amount of disclosure. From a legal realist perspective, state
court common-law decisions and the trends evident in those deci-
sions, viewed broadly, can be seen as a product of market forces far
preferable to a federal agency's unilateral pronouncements, or
agency reaction to judicial decisionmaking with which the agency
does not happen to agree.
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